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NOTE
THE AD HOMINEM ELEMENT IN THE TREATMENT
OF ZONING PROBLEMS
Zoning is a statutory form of land-use planning by which property is
classified according to the uses to which it is susceptible, the various uses
are drawn together in compatible groups, and each group is assigned to a
district in the community reserved exclusively for residential, commercial,
or industrial purposes.' Because no broadly-conceived zoning ordinance
can explicitly provide for all of the particularized needs of the individuals
and property it encompasses, three methods have evolved for permitting
property to be used in ways inconsistent with the zoning program. Prohibited uses dating from before the passage of a zoning ordinance (called
nonconformities) are sometimes condoned solely because they pre-exist the
ordinance 2 on the theory that it would be unfair or unconstitutional to make
an owner abandon an employment of his property which was legal when
instituted. 3 Frequently special exceptions (for public service facilities and
the like) are specifically enumerated in the ordinance and must be permitted
unless opponents can demonstrate in each case that the establishment of an
excepted use would be detrimental to the neighborhood. 4 Variances, either
as to use or dimensions, 5 are new and otherwise unsanctioned employments
of property which are generally granted when the applicant cannot feasibly
1 See Dallstream & Hunt, Variations, Exceptions, and Special Uses, 1954 U. ILL.
L. FoRum 213, stressing the "two cardinal objectives of sound zoning: first, to keep
the number of districts as few as possible; and, second, to include only those uses
which may properly be associated."
2 See AmERIcAN

SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALs, MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE

MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE] ; Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953).
3 See notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text. The justification for a nonconformity provision resembles that offered for permitting variances, see Green, The
Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances From the Zoning
Ordinance, 29 N.C.L. Rxv. 245, 249-70 (1951), insofar as requiring the cessation of
existing nonconforming uses could be considered an unnecessary hardship on the landowner. Cf. Mack Appeal, 384 Pa. 586, 122 A.2d 48 (1956). See also the discussion
of "single and separate ownership" provisions, text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
4 See, e.g., Stone v. Cray, 89 N.H. 483, 486-87, 200 AtI. 517, 521 (1938);
Devereaux Foundation, Inc., Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 483, 41 A.2d 744, 746, appeal
dismissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945); U.S. DEVT OF CommERCE, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT], in 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 877 (3d ed. 1949)
[hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF]; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 518 (1955). "[T]he
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act . . . has been used in nearly every state as
a basis for zoning enabling legislation." Forewordto MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE at iii.
See Searles v. Darling, 46 Del. (7 Terry) 263, 266-67, 83 A.2d 96, 98 (1951).
5 Cf. notes 61-63 infra and accompanying text

§ 4 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
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make a conforming use of the property and the use which he contemplates
will not seriously disrupt the neighborhood plan. 6
Since inevitably demands arising under any of these circumstances
threaten to corrode the effectiveness of the zoning plan, those responsible
for its implementation must, in the exercise of discretion, be extremely cautious in evaluating the merits of each application. This caution should, however, be tempered by an awareness that overstrict enforcement of the ordinance might make the use of some land prohibitively expensive. Such a
result would be objectionable not only from the point of view of individual
landowners but also from the standpoint of the community, which is legitimately interested in achieving the maximum productive use of all property.
When the agency responsible for administering a zoning ordinance
deals with a request for permission to use property in an unsanctioned manner by one who has owned the property since before the ordinance was
enacted, the proper questions for resolution are whether the use which is
sought to be made of the property is reasonably amenable to the general
plan of uses permitted in the area, and whether the physical character of
the land is such as to justify some relaxation of the zoning scheme. Normally the agency will be concerned with the applicant only insofar as he has
taken or plans to take some action which alters the land itself. An owner,
however, may sell, lease, or otherwise transfer an interest in his land to
another who may wish to use the land in a manner not permitted by the
ordinance. Then the question arises whether his application should be resolved solely on the basis of the physical condition of the land and its surroundings or whether the application may properly be resolved by placing
personal restrictions upon the applicant who acquired his interest in the
property subsequent to the passage of the ordinance. In other words, does
or should the fact that a subsequent owner (or lessee, etc.) is applying
instead of the owner (or lessee, etc.) of the property when the ordinance
was passed lead to a different result? The treatment of this question goes
to the fundamental principles of zoning.
THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-ImPosaD HARDSHIP

One facet of the problem involves the doctrine of self-imposed hardship
by which a purchaser of land after the enactment of a zoning ordinance
-will not be granted a variance permit if the conditions which make the
property worthless for conforming uses existed before the zoning ordinance.
For present purposes this doctrine must be distinguished from what may be
6 See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7(3) ("such variance . . .
as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a
literal enforcement ...

of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship ....

") ;

CoLo. REv. STAT. § 106-2-17 (1953) (variance permissible "where by reason of exceptional narrowness [and other extraordinary conditions] . . . the strict application
[would work hardship on] . . . the owner of such property"). See also MODEL
ZONING ORDINANCE § 9(3), adopting the language of the STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT § 7(3). See generally Green, supra note 3.
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termed self-created hardship, 7 which applies a similar bar with regard to
hardship conditions arising from acts done to the property after the
passage of the ordinance. An example of self-created hardship would
arise where A, owning property in an area already restricted to singlefamily dwellings, quarries sand on the property to a depth of ten feet and
then allows the property to be used as a dump; B later buys the property
and seeks permission to erect an apartment house, complaining that to require him to fit the property for single-family dwellings would be prohibitively expensive. B will be deqied the permit, as A would have been, because the hardship was created by the owner himself-if not by B then by
8
his predecessor in title-since the ordinance was adopted. The situation
would be one of self-imposed hardship if the sandpit and dump had existed
before the ordinance's passage: even assuming that A, had he applied,
would have been granted a variance, B's application will be denied because
he purchased with knowledge that the only feasible uses to which the property could be put were not sanctioned by the terms of the ordinance.9 It is
obvious that zoning laws could easily be evaded if any other result were
reached with regard to self-created hardships. But in the self-imposed
hardship situation the only thing that A or B has done to "evade" the ordinance is to contract to sell the land. To deny the variance permit to B is
to ignore the fact that the owner has done nothing to alter the physical
character of the property in contravention of the ordinance. Thus the selfimposed hardship doctrine may be said to be ad hominem in the sense that
it concerns itself not with the physical characteristics of the land as it existed
at the ordinance's passage but with private arrangements between its owners.
The doctrine appears to be most commonly invoked in New York; 10
11
Elsebut it also provides the basis of decisions in other jurisdictions.
7
For cases confusing the distinction, see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Waskelo,
168 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1960); Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Ass'n, 197 Md. 46,
78 A.2d 164 (1951) ; Volpe Appeal, 384 Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956).
8 The fact that B in a case like this did not know that the hardship had been
self-created led the court in Matter of Hepner, 152 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
to hint that the property might be rezoned, although it held that a variance could
not be granted.
9 The hypothetical self-imposed hardship situation discussed in the text closely

corresponds to the facts of Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead, 16 Misc. 2d 554, 176

N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958). In that case the complaint challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied; the demurrer relied on the plaintiff's failure to
apply first to the zoning board. It was held that such an application was unnecessary
since the doctrine of self-imposed hardship would have rendered the application futile.
See Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 App. Div. 2d 850, 851, 190 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545, aff'd, 7
N.Y.2d 852, 164 N.E.2d 863, 196 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1959): "One who knowingly enters
into a contract to purchase land for a prohibited use cannot thereafter have a variance
in the use of the premises on the ground of unnecessary hardship." Cases are collected and criticized in 1 RATHKOPF 48-6 to -20; another collection is found in Annot,
168 A.L.R. 13, 45-46 (1947).
10 See cases collected in authorities cited in note 9 supra.
1 E.g., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.
1956) ; In re Cresko, 400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960). Compare Spalding v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 719, 137 A.2d 755 (1957) (adopting self-imposed hardship reasoning), zath Culinary Institute of America v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637 (1956) (opposite result reached without mentioning
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where, the fact that the applicant bought with knowledge of the zoning
restriction has been said to "weigh heavily" against him -1 or at least to be
one of the circumstances to be considered. 13 New York, however, has specifically declined to apply the doctrine to applications for permission to build
on lots substandard as to size, 14 the theory being that a denial in such circumstances would render the land in question entirely useless unless adjoining property could be acquired. 15 The refusal to employ the rule in these
circumstances reveals one of its logical weaknesses. There are only two ways
in which property can become substandard as to size. On the one hand, a
plot which conforms as to size at the ordinance's passage may be divided
and sold in part so as to render the remainder substandard. This is an
example of a self-created hardship for which a permit may be denied without resort to the rule of self-imposed hardship. On the other hand, if the
the rule). Despite the acceptance of the doctrine in New York, at least two cases
have criticized it and attempted to distinguish the cases invoking it. Land Purchasing Corp. v. Grunewald, 20 Misc. 2d 175, 195 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Murphy v. Kramer, 16 Misc. 2d 374, 182 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
'2 Kroeger v. Stahl, 248 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1957) ; cf. Searles v. Darling, 46 Del.
(7 Terry) 263, 83 A.2d 96 (1951) (self-imposed hardship is "almost, if not quite,
sufficient" to preclude a variance).
13 Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Biern v.
Morris, 14 N.J. 529, 103 A.2d 361 (1954); Lumund v. Board of Adjustment, 4 N.J.
577, 581, 73 A.2d 545, 547 (1950) (self-imposed hardship a "material element").
See also Stolz v. Ellenstein, 7 N.J. 291, 81 A.2d 476 (1951); Note, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 516, 521 n.41 (1955). The doctrine has appeared in still other opinions as
dictum, Frankel v. City of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97, 162 A.2d 447 (1960); Siegel v.
Lassiter, 6 App. Div. 2d 879, 880, 177 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896, appeal denied, 6 App. Div.
2d 1013, 154 N.E.2d 697, 178 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1958) ; Bobrowski v. Feriola, 2 App. Div.
2d 708, 709, 153 N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (1956); Hood Appeal, 72 Mont. Co. 12, 6 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 275 (C.P. 1955), or as a makeweight argument, City of Little Rock v.
Goodman, 222 Ark. 350, 260 S.W.2d 450 (1953) (relying principally on the theory
that tenants at will do not have the standing to apply for "rezoning") ; City of San
Marino v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 4 Cal. Rptr. 547, 557 (Dist Ct. App. 1960);
Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959) (stating also that under the statute a vendee
may not apply); City of Miami Beach v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy, 108
So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1958); Application of Max Kirsch, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 1074, 1076,
202 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Upper St. Clair Township Grange Zoning
Case, 397 Pa. 67, 71, 152 A.2d 768, 771 (1959).
14 1 RATHKOPF 48-20; see Siegel v. Lassiter, 6 App. Div. 2d 879, 177 N.Y.S.2d
894, appeal denied, 6 App. Div. 2d 1013, 154 N.E.2 697, 178 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1958);
Mandalay Constr. Co. v. Zimmer, 22 Misc. 2d 543, 194 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Flanagan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Misc. 2d 922, 149 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 979, 151 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1956). Accord, Stout v. Jenkins, 268
S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954) ; Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322,
64 A.2d 783 (1949).
15 The effect which zoning laws may properly have on requiring a transfer of
property is still unsettled. In Macchia v. Board of Appeals, 7 Misc. 2d 763, 765,
164 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1957), involving property substandard as to size,
it was said: "No Administrative Board may compel a property owner either to sell
his property to a neighbor or to purchase additional property from him, nor may it
use his refusal to do so as a ground for denying any application he may present to it."
But see Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d
598 (1958), upholding the principle of amortization, see note 75 infra and accompanying text, but remanding to determine whether the cost-including that of relocation-was confiscatory. Compare the Cook County, Illinois, practice of permitting
certain variations by way of conveyance to a third party and reconveyance to the
original grantor, with the second deed containing a covenant embodying the "permit"
limitations and running in favor of area residents. Dallstream & Hunt, mupra note 1,
at 236-38.
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lot were substandard before the ordinance's passage it would be a nonconformity on which the zoning board should permit the owner to build, with6
out any need to raise, if only to reject, the rule of self-imposed hardship.'
A rather different rationale is sometimes encountered in cases where
it is claimed that the denial of a variance will deprive the property of all
economic utility whatsoever. This rationale attempts to distinguish between
the balancing process involved in considering variance applications and the
unqualified constitutional prohibition on taking property without just compensation. 17 The distinction is perhaps founded on the usual statutory
mandate that variances shall be permitted where a requirement of conformity would be unnecessarily severe and the proposed variance would not
This balancing of interests is
seriously disrupt the neighborhood plan.'
said to be inapplicable to cases where the land cannot possibly conform and
still have any utility.' 9 In that situation a purchaser with knowledge of
the ordinance may still qualify for a variance,20 whereas in the other his
knowledge will be a factor to be balanced against the possibility of unnecessary severity. While it is valid to distinguish between situations in
which the variance is sought simply to enable the applicant to maximize
his profit and those in which the land cannot otherwise provide a reasonable
return on investment (it is only in the latter sitnation that a variance is
ever permissible 21), the further distinction which some courts have tried
to draw is unjustified by the facts of the cases which were before them;
the "taking" rationale is apparently only a subterfuge for avoiding the
inequities of the self-imposed hardship rule.
In defense of the doctrine of self-imposed hardship it may be suggested
that when an owner sells his land without having previously acquired a
variance permit, the purchase price will ordinarily be adjusted downward
to compensate the purchaser for his trouble and expense in making the
property conform. To grant the purchaser a variance after he has gotten
16Flanagan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Misc. 2d 922, 149 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup.
See the discussion of
"single and separate ownership" provisions, text accompanying notes 85-90 infra;
cf. note 15 supra.
17 See Frankel v. City of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97, 162 A.2d 447 (1960) (permission to build professional office building improperly denied where property
had no value for residential use although in an area zoned residential), citing
City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954), which held that
a refusal to grant a permit to a vendee was arbitrary, without specifically reaching
the self-imposed hardship point, and Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Ass'n, 197
Md. 46, 78 A.2d 164 (1951), using self-imposed hardship language in a self-created
hardship case. Compare Searles v. Darling, 46 Del. (7 Terry) 263, 83 A.2d 96
(1951), with Homan v. Lynch, 51 Del. (1 Storey) 433, 147 A.2d 650 (1959). See
also Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d 845

Ct.), aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 979, 151 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1956).

(Sup. Ct 1941).

For a comparison of
18 E.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT § 7(3).
variances, which are to be granted only when not seriously disruptive of the neighborhood plan, and special exceptions, see notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
19 But see Application of Max Kirsch, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 1074, 202 N.Y.S.2d 547
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Matter of Hepner, 152 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct 1956).
20 See cases cited note 17 supra.
21 Smolow v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 71, 73, 137 A.2d 251, 252 (1958).
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the property at a lower price would give him a bonus.22 Whether or not
this is the usual situation, it is rarely mentioned as a fact bearing on the
result in particular cases.2 3 And the argument is at best circular; if there
were no self-imposed hardship rule there would be no need to sell land at a
sacrifice price in these circumstances.
A more persuasive argument in favor of the rule is that a major goal
of zoning, neighborhood conformity, is furthered by precluding a class of
variance applicants who might have avoided hardship. But such an argument is ad hominern in that it penalizes either the vendor by making it
impossible for him to sell at a decent price, when, by hypothesis, he has done
nothing wrong, or the purchaser who has been foolish enough to buy land
which he cannot develop in conformity with the ordinance's standards. A
possible solution for the owner and prospective purchaser would be for
them to apply jointly for the variance. 24 In most cases this procedure would
work,2 5 although some courts have reasoned that the prospective purchaser
is the real applicant in interest and have proceeded to determine the issue
as if the present owner had not been joined. 26 But even if the plan does
work, it is an unnecessary technicality; the only procedure consistent with
the aims of zoning regulation is to treat owner and purchaser exactly alike
when the board inquires whether or not the property can feasibly be used
in a conforming manner. 27 If such use is not feasible, a variance should be
granted.
STANDING

A requirement that the parties must have "standing" before a court
will hear their case generally means that they must have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the suit to insure that resolution of the issues will be of
more than academic interest to them.2s In connection with zoning, the term
22 Cf. Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 App. Div. 2d 850, 851, 190 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544, aff'd,
7 N.Y.2d 852, 164 N.E.2d 863, 196 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1959): "Presumably, [the applicant] . . . acquired the lots with notice of the zoning resolution and paid a consideration appropriate to the limitation df the use. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
23
In addition to Blumberg v. Feriola, stpra note 22, see Minney v. City of
Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), appeal dismissed,
359 U.S. 436 (1959), which noted that the applicant, a contract vendee, could refuse
to perform if the permit were not granted and therefore would incur no hardship from
the board's refusal.
24 Or the vendor could apply himself. But see Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead,
16 Misc. 2d 554, 176 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958), where the vendor alleged financial
inability even to have plans drawn on which the zoning board might determine his
right to a variance.
25 joinder by the owner is often contemplated by the operative ordinance or
forms. See the forms printed in 4 NEw YORK CONSOL. LAWs SERV., accompanying
Gen. City Law § 81, at 62-63 (1950). Cf. Richman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
391 26
Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280 (1958).
E.g., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.
1956) (joint application by owner and contract vendee refused on self-imposed hardship reasoning as to latter) ; cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Macauley, 72 R.I. 206, 49 A.2d 917
(1946) (applicant held to have failed to show a clear legal interest).
27 A number of cases have so reasoned. E.g., Goldreyer v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 136 A.2d 789 (1957); Schneider v. Board of Appeals, 402
IIl. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949); Board of Adjustment v. Board of Educ., 326 P.2d
800 (Okla. 1958).
28 See discussion in HART & WECHSLER, TEE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SysTam 160-66 (1953).
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has been used with a great deal of confusion. At the minimum it means
that the applicant must show some interest in the property in question
before his application for a permit to use it in a varying manner wil be
considered.2
In an early New Jersey case 3 0 a contract vendee who sought to reverse
a zoning board's refusal of a variance permit was denied mandamus on the
ground that he had no present right to build. A later decision in the same
litigation 31 admitted the vendee to standing because the owner of the property had by then been joined in the action. Notably, however, the earlier
opinion had admitted that the owner was at that time a party to the action.
More recently, the refusal to give an applicant with no present right to
build standing to apply for a variance has been espoused in Rhode Island,
although in that case as well the owner had joined in the application.32 In
1954 Kentucky held that a contractor can apply in his own name as agent
of an absentee owner.3 3 The court said that protestants who thought themselves prejudiced by the owner's absence from the record could have joined
him had they desired. 34 But two years later the same court, adopting the
reasoning of the self-imposed hardship rule, held that a contract vendeethe real applicant in interest-was not entitled to a variance permit.3 5
Since rules of standing and the availability of affirmative relief are inevitably
related, this holding effectively undermines the earlier liberality as to
standing which the Kentucky court seemed to manifest. Elsewhere,
vendees, 6 lessees,3 7 optionees, 88 and prospective purchasers 39 have been
29At the maximum it will require that the applicant be the owner of the property in question before standing is accorded. Tripp v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 84
R.I. 262, 123 A.2d 144 (1956). Cf. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 106-2-17 (1953) (variances are
to be granted where their refusal would work hardship on "the owner of such property").
(Emphasis added.)
3
0 Malone v. Mayor & Aldermen, 7 N.J. Misc. 955, 147 At. 571 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
31 Adams v. Mayor & Aldermen, 107 N.J.L. 149-50, 151 At. 863-64 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1930); see Wilson v. Township Comm., 123 N.J.L. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (Sup.
Ct 1939).
3
2 Sun Oil v. Macauley, 72 RI. 206, 49 A.2d 917 (1946).
33 Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954); see Hatch v. Fiscal Court,
242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
34 268 S.W.2d at 645.
3
3 5 Arrow Transp. Co. v.

Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1956).
6 E.g., Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 24 12, 330 P.2d 255 (Dist Ct.
App. 1948), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959) (vendee could avoid contract if
permit not granted). Contra, Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420
(1956) ; cf. Cohn v. County Bd., 135 Cal. App. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955) (semble) ; Carson v. Board of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 N.E.2d 116 (1947) ;
Claremont Gardens, Inc. v. Barker, 282 App. Div. 1068, 126 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1953);
Elkins
Park Improvement Ass'n Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949).
37
E.g., City of Little Rock v. Goodman, 228 Ark. 350, 260 S.W.2d 450 (1953).
The handling of authorities and the denomination of the petition as for "rezoning"
in Goodman exemplify the confusion that results when technicalities obscure the basic
function of the zoning board-to classify uses. But cf. Dube v. Allman, 333 Ill. App.
538, 77 N.E.2d 855 (1948); Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278,
140 A.2d 604 (1958); Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Bd., 64 R.I. 197, 12 A.24 219
(1940).
3
8 E.g., Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946). But cf.
Nott v. Wolff, 18 11. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960) (lessee with option to purchase); Hatch v. Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
39 E.g., Chad Homes, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 5 Misc. 2d 20, 159 N.Y.S.2d
383 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Appeal of Schaeffer, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 468 (C.P. 1955). But see
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denied standing. In some cases the power of the applicant to rescind the
transaction if the permit were refused has been given as the reason for
denying standing.40 In others the reasoning has rested on language of the
local ordinance requiring applications by the owner-even where the
enabling statute has not used that term.41 On the other hand, almost all
state statutes have a "persons aggrieved" test to determine who may appeal
from the initial determination of a variance application; 2 a nonowner has
43
been accorded standing under this broad test.
The argument that a qualified applicant must be able to show that some
injury will result from the denial of his application closely resembles the
reasoning used in support of the self-imposed hardship doctrine; to deny
standing because the applicant can show no prospect of injury is to ignore
the principle that the basic question in passing on such an application is
whether the land, regardless of who its owner may be, is amenable to useif it is to be used at all-in strict conformity with the zoning regulations.
Two factors of practical importance must be borne in mind when considering who should have standing. First, to deny standing to all but the
legal owner applying as the prospective user of the permit may discourage
the transfer of property. Obviously, a prospective purchaser will seldom
be inclined to buy land if he cannot be assured that his contemplated use
of the property will be allowed. Even assuming the feasibility of a joint
application with the owner,44 its use may be stymied by the vendor's reGoldreyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 136 A.2d 789 (1957) (owner
and prospective purchaser join). In both White v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 176,
338 P.2d 778 (1959), and Guenther v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 85 R.I. 37, 125 A.2d
214 (1956), the owner was permitted to apply for the benefit of a prospective
purchaser.
40
E.g., Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958), appeal dismnissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959). Cf. Chad Homes, Inc. v. Board
of Appeals, 5 Misc. 2d 20, 159 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct 1957). But cf. Slater v.
Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) ; O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 (1956).
41
Tripp v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 84 R.I. 262, 123 A.Zd 144 (1956) ; cf. Richman
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280 (1958), where standing
was granted because the requirement of the ordinance as to who must fill in an
application had been changed from "owner or his authorized agent" to "applicant or
his authorized agent."
42
E.g., STANDADM STATE ZONING ENABLiNG AcT § 7; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§9-465A, 11-807D (1956); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65856; DEr.. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 324
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 24, § 73-5 (Smith-Hurd 1942); cf. IowA CODE ANN.
§ 414.7 (1949) ("property owner aggrieved") ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 90-A, § 61
(Supp. 1959) (no specification of nature of interest). See also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 69-821 (1957) ("person or persons having a substantial interest") ; Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 100.079 (1959) (persons "injuriously affected or aggrieved"). As to ordinances see
Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 1494, Dec. 13, 1949, as amended, §§ 633 ("any person
desiring any permit" may appeal), 634 (contemplating application with the owner's
permission), in 3 METZENBAUM, ZONING (2d ed. 1955) ; New Haven, Conn., Zoning
Ordinance, Dec. 1958, §§ 1032-1033A.
43
Mandalay Constr., Inc. v. Zinmer, 22 Misc. 2d 543, 194 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
44
See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
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luctance to appear before the board, or simply by his unavailability. On the
other hand, the heavy burden already on some boards 45 would be materially
augmented by an increase in the number of applications following any
relaxation in the rules of standing.
A resolution of the problem of standing in the light of these conflicting
factors may be aided by examining the function of a zoning board. Theoretically, such a board is established to give concrete meaning to an abstract
program of land use fashioned for a specific area. It is in the interest of
the community in general that the zoning board be informed as to the possible uses to which land within its jurisdiction may be put; this function
may be better served if every reasonable opportunity is taken to clarify the
ambiguities resulting from the interplay of abstract zoning laws and the
physical realities of the property in question. The fact that applications
usually may be made ex parte 46 suggests that the framers of zoning laws
did not contemplate the adversary procedure associated with civil litigation
wherein a party disputes specific rights of another within a particular factual
context. The fact that enabling acts fail to equate "applicant" and "owner"
and adopt a "persons aggrieved" test for appeals to the zoning board 47
militates against restricting standing to make the initial application to
owners alone. A better rule would give standing to all those who have
entered into some good-faith bargair for the purchase or use of the property
in question, including optionees, lessees, and vendees. The group which
this rule leaves out consists of persons such as prospective purchasers who
have not vouchsafed their commitment by a cash expenditure or legal obligation which would justify the sacrifice of the board's time which their
admission to standing would require.
AsSIGNABILITY Or RIGHTS

There is another possible difficulty in requiring the prospective user
(lessee, vendee, etc.) to rely on the owner's obtaining a permit which will
be transferred to him with the property: the board may grant the permit
but limit its use to the owner. A vendee will discover that he cannot use
the property as the vendor had; or he may learn of the limitation beforehand and refuse to consummate the transaction. In either event, an ad
hominem approach to permit rights will hamper the use and transfer of
48
property.
45
In urban areas hearings are too short and too many. See Note, Zoning
Variances and Exceptions: The PhiladelphiaExperience, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 553
(1955).
4
6 See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT § 7.

47 See

ibid.

48 The situation is analogous to the problem posed when rights in a nonconforming
use are limited by ordinance to the present owner, see text accompanying notes
60-84 infra. It may be said that in the case of a nonassignable permit for a variance
or special exception the owner or user of the permit has acquiesced in the permit re-
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Except at the zoning board level, 49 the ad hominent solution of making
variance or special exception permits nonassignable has apparently gained
a foothold only in Massachusetts. An early case in that state 50 held that
a permit to erect buildings, which remained unexercised over eight years,
was not assignable to a purchaser of the property. A dictum indicated that
if a building had been erected, rights to its maintenance would have run
2
with the land.51 However, a more recent Massachusetts case 5 held that
a permit to use a wharf for a boat-rental service, a use not expressly
authorized by the ordinance, was not assignable, despite the fact that it had
been exercised. The prospective assignee had, in fact, sought to expand
3
the use, but the court refused even to allow its continuation .
This amenability to an ad hominem approach in the granting of permits
may find its source in the power commonly conferred on zoning boards to
grant variances subject to "appropriate conditions and safeguards" and to
54
"modify" the orders of zoning officers in granting or refusing permits.
Within this broad range of discretion some boards have attempted to make

permits personal rather than related to the physical characteristics of the
strictions. But even were this so, as pointed out in Olevson v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 71 R.I. 303, 44 A.2d 720 (1945), the issue is not acquiescence but the range
of uses to which the land may properly and reasonably be put. If consent to ad
honiwnem conditions is given as the only means for obtaining the permit, it is unfair
to use this consent against the permittee, since it was improperly extracted in the
first place. And if an applicant acquiesces in the limitation of a permit to his own
use in order to obtain the permit where the condition of the land itself does not
really justify a variance or exception, he has collaborated in an evasion of the
zoning laws.
49 Zoning boards have often attempted to make permits nonassignable. See, e.g.,
Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 101 N.H. 460, 146 A.2d 257 (1958);
Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Appeals, 6 N.J. Misc. 686, 142 Atl. 548 (Sup. Ct.
1928); OIevson v. Zoning Bd. of Review, supra note 48; Hickerson v. Flannery,
302 S.W.2d 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).
50 Hanley v. Cook, 245 Mass. 563, 139 N.E. 654 (1923).
5 Id. at 565, 139 N.E. at 654.
52

Todd v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 162, 148 N.E.2d 380 (1958).

53 A subsequent reconveyance to the original permittee was held incapable of
restoring the permit rights. Maki v. Town of Yarmouth, 163 N.E.2d 633 (Mass.
1960).
54 E.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7. A typical provision as to
a zoning board's appellate powers is that the board may affirm, reverse, or modify the
zoning officer's initial order. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 100.082(1) (1959). Applications to
the board for special exceptions may generally be granted "subject to appropriate
conditions and safeguards." See, e.g., MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 4 (1961). See generally the discussion in Reps, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Conditional Zoning
Variances and Exceptions, 2 SYRAcuSE L. REv. 54 (1950). Conditions must be
consonant with the general spirit of the legislation. MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE § 9.2;
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7. For an example of improper conditions, see Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 6 N.J. Misc. 686, 142
Atl. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1928), in which the zoning board had imposed the following
conditions on a variance permit to erect a wire factory: (1) that the building be
occupied only by the applicant and be used only as a wire factory; (2) that three of
the sides be of brick trimming; (3) that trees be planted in the immediate area; and
(4) that the ground within a one hundred foot radius be landscaped in a manner
suitable for a residential area. The court struck down all the conditions as unrelated
to valid zoning objectives.
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land.5 5 With the exception of Massachusetts, however, these attempts have
been thwarted by the courts. 56 The conditions and safeguards which have
been sustained by the courts have had limitations determinable apart from
change of ownership; 57 for example, a Rhode Island court upheld permission to use a lot in a varying manner "as long as the conditions affecting
the beneficial use of [the lot and] . . . not the character of the neighbor58
hood" remained the same.
The ad hominem approach to permit rights is clearly faulty. It is
theoretically unsound because it ignores the principle that zoning looks
to the land and not to its owners.59 Furthermore, such an approach
presents practical difficulties. It is open to abuse by board members wanting to insure their own reappointments, to earn illegal compensation, or
simply to extend neighborly courtesy. In addition, the personal settlement
of zoning disputes is difficult to administer. How can a court review a
board's finding that an applicant may or may not be trusted? Will the fact
that the applicant is honest lessen the impact of the variation on the neighborhood plan or insure that the owner will always be able to maintain a
decent establishment? These questions answer themselves. And so here
too the proper approach should be to determine what use the land justifies,
not what consideration the owner deserves.
55 See note 49 supra. It has been suggested that personal permits can be justified
on the basis that zoning boards, knowing the persons with whom they deal, may
properly trust one applicant but not others to maintain the property in an acceptable
fashion. HORAcK & NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 184 (1955). This kind of discrimination ought to be unnecessary; any correction of a failure to conform to the
conditions imposed may properly be handled through zoning sanctions. Furthermore,
the personal approach is subject to the worst kind of politically-motivated abuse.
56 See note 49 supra. See also Cohn v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Cal.
App. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (permittee may withdraw in
favor of legal owner for appeal purposes); Elsinore Property Owners' Ass'n v.
Morwand Homes, Inc., 286 App. Div. 1105, 146 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1955) (owner may
continue to develop according to plat plan filed by predecessor in title although intervening ordinance renders some undeveloped lots substandard); Feneck v. Murdock,
16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (former shareholders succeed to
rights of corporation dissolved during proceeding). See generally 1 RATHKOPF 873;
2 METzENBAUM, ZONING 971, 986 (2d ed. 1955) ; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 500 (1942).
.57 See, e.g., Reps, supra note 54, at 65: "[P]ermits in which the sole condition
concerned a time limitation on the permitted use . . . have been frequently ordered
by the New York courts." Guenther v. Zoning Ed. of Review, 85 R.I. 37, 125 A.2d
214 (1956), comes close to the line separating time limitations from personal permits.
In that case an owner was granted a two-year permit to use a large, unsalable house
in a residential zone as a convalescent home. Other homes in the area faced the same
problem, and the court knew that the house was to be sold if the permit were obtained. Nonetheless it affirmed. The danger, of course, is that this kind of temporary expedient may ripen into a permanent permit and that other homeowners in
the area will then resort to the same device.
5

8 Mastrati v. Strauss, 75 R.I. 417, 419, 67 A.2d 29, 31 (1949) ; cf. Neiburger v.
Lewis, 185 Misc. 437, 57 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (permit to use for duration
of structure).
59
In Gold v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958), a
claim by a barber that he was too old and ill to work for others was rejected as a
basis for allowing him to conduct a barbershop in his basement as an accessory use.
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THE TRANSrERtAILITY OF A NONCONFORMITY

Nonconformities 60 are uses 61 or dimensional 62 or structural 63 variations existing at the time of passage of a zoning ordinance which are not
permitted except insofar as the ordinance expressly suffers their continuation.6 4 Three reasons are usually assigned for permitting these uses and
variations to continue even though they would not be allowed to commence
as variances after the ordinance's passage: it would be too great a hardship
to require the immediate destruction of all nonconformities; 65 zoning laws
would have met with much more popular resistance had they required the
immediate termination of nonconformities; 66 and due process requires that
owners be permitted to exercise existing uses indefinitely. 67 These reasons
illustrate a fundamental divergence in the approach to zoning problems.
The second (and perhaps, tacitly, the first) presupposes that it is within
the competence of the police power of a state to require immediate cessation
of uses which do not conform to its zoning laws. This view, however, has
gained little acceptance.6 8 The more common view admits that sometimes
the hardship on the occupant or owner becomes so great that his nonconforming use must be allowed to remain despite the community's desire
for its destruction. In the ad hominem context, the question is whether
cessation of a nonconforming use can validly be made to hinge on a change
of ownership or possession.
As a practical matter a permissible nonconformity gives the owner an
unnatural and remunerative monopoly, especially-and this is frequently
the case-insofar as the nonconformity has a unique economic value.6 9 If
the owner wishes to sell his land but finds that he cannot transfer the right
to exercise the nonconforming use, he will either have to make the property
conform at some expense to himself or sell at a price adjusted downward to
60
In MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE § 4, at 30 (Commentary) it is proposed that the
term "non-conformity" should include both nonconforming uses and all other variations which are permissible because they were in existence at or before the ordinance's
passage.
61
E.g., a grocery store in a residential district.
62 E.g., a lot with a frontage of 40 feet in a district requiring 60 feet.
63
E.g., a building set back 15 feet from the street line in a district requiring
25 feet.
64 Courts differ as to whether it is mandatory or only permissible that nonconformities be allowed to continue. Compare Blanarik Appeal, 375 Pa. 209, 100 A.2d
58 (1953), with Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958). See also New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, July 25, 1916,
as amended, Oct. 30, 1950, § 7-A; Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and
102 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 92-94 (1953).
an Approach,
65
BAssErr, ZONING 105 (1936); Note, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 477, 478 (1942).
66 BAssETT, ZONING 108, 113 (1936).
536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949);
67 See, e.g., Schneider v. Board of Appeals, 402 Ill.
Note, mtpra note 65, at 483. See also Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553,
152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) ; Pierce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506
(1956), 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1011 (statute questionably construed so as to allow
housing of former outdoor welding shop).
68 See Note, snpra note 65, at 477, 482-86.
69 See Note, mspra note 64, at 101.
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compensate for the vendee's difficulties in achieving conformity. In these
circumstances the original owner will probably continue his use of the
property until, for personal reasons, he is forced to sell at the lower price.
The only court which seems to have dealt directly with this problem
is the Idaho Supreme Court in O'Connor v. City of Moscow.7" The
ordinance in question prohibited the opening of specified new businesses in
a given district and provided that any change of ownership should be
deemed such an opening. 71 In striking down the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking of property,72 the court explained that:

"Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal.
Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that
extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property
lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is
annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right." 73
This language suggests that any requirement that nonconforming uses be
terminated would be invalid not simply as an unreasonable means of
achieving the legitimate object of zoning but as a deprivation of the unqualified right to continue indefinitely all preexisting lawful uses. The
dissent draws the implication that the majority would find it just as unreasonable to require the cessation of nonconformities within a fixed time
period as to fix a cut-off point for nonconformities timed by the duration
of the ownership existing at the time of the ordinance's passage.7 4 Such a
rule would destroy the principle of amortization which has gained increasing acceptance as an equitable means for achieving zoning aims.
Some zoning ordinances provide for fixed periods of amortization during which an owner must wind up his nonconforming use.75 Commentators
70 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949).
71 For other statutes and ordinances seeking to achieve a similar effect, see the
Chicago, Ill., Zoning Ordinance, April 5, 1923, as amended, § 20 in 3 METZENBAUM,
ZONING 2209 (2d ed. 1955) : "[Various nonconforming uses] shall be discontinued upon
transfer of ownership or termination of the existing lease . . . of the person in
possession . . . unless then maintained in a building designed for such nonconforming use, in which event . . . [the use must cease at the end of the building's
normal useful life]"; ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 24, § 73-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960),
authorizing the enactment of provisions for "the elimination of such uses of unimproved lands or lot areas when the existing rights of the persons in possession
thereof are terminated. . . ." See the discussion of such an ordinance in Todd v.
Board
of Appeals, 337 Mass. 162, 166, 148 N.E.2d 380, 383-84 (1958).
72
Under both U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, and IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.
73 69 Idaho at 42, 202 P.2d at 404, quoting Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex.
350, 355, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (1921).
74 See 69 Idaho at 46, 202 P.2d at 405.
75 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-19 (1953)
(empowering board to
provide for termination "either by specifying the period in which nonconforming
uses shall be required to cease, or by providing a formula [for termination] . . . so
fixed as to allow for the recovery or amortization of the investment in the nonconformance") ; GA. CODE ANN. § 69-835 (1957) (amortization); OrIO REv. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 713.15 (Page Supp. 1960) (requiring corporation to "provide in any zoning
ordinance for the completion, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of
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believe that the period allowed should be sufficient to permit the landowner
76
to earn compensation for the eventual termination of the nonconformity.
Of course, a legislature can only estimate the time required for such recoupment; 77 but Louisiana's judicial acceptance of a one-year period 78 has
been strongly condemned 79 and certainly does not reflect sober consideration of the compensation principle. Although O'Connor properly rejected
nontransferability-albeit with broader language than the facts of that
case demanded-the Idaho court failed to examine the sharp practical
distinction between any time limitation applicable to all landowners in a
single community and a limitation based on the termination of ownership.
The O'Connor rationale-that a state may not constitutionally deprive
an owner of his right to make a lawful use of property and to transfer that
property together with its use-could be applied as strongly to defeat the
principle of amortization as to invalidate the unbending nontransferability
of nonconformities. Yet while it is true that amortization depresses the
sale value of property and, at the appointed time, will extinguish the
valuable nonconforming use, this sort of program for the orderly extinguishment of nonconformities may easily be distinguished from a system
which chooses such a fortuitous date for achieving conformity as that of
transfer. By amortization all objectionable uses will be removed from a
neighborhood within a definite and ascertainable period. To require their
removal as of the date of transfer of ownership encourages owners of nonconforming uses to hold their property until the last benefit has been wrung
from it. Frequently this period will be measured by the very lives of the
users of the property when the ordinance was passed. The effect is to
achieve expeditious conformity only as to property whose owners are
forced by personal considerations to sell before all economic advantage has
been realized. And since, as has been seen, these owners will be compelled
to sell at a loss, they will have been penalized for reasons having no relation
nonconforming uses upon such reasonable terms as are set forth in the zoning ordinance"). Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 24, § 73-1 (a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960)
(allowing provisions to be made "for the elimination of uses of unimproved lands
or lot areas when the existing rights of persons in possession thereof are terminated
or when the uses to which they are devoted are discontinued"), with Village of
Skolde v. Almendinger, 5 Ill. App. 2d 522, 126 N.E.2d 421 (1955) (allowing a purchaser subsequent to the ordinance's passage to continue operation of a trailer camp
on a lot previously used by the purchaser adversely to the owner).
76 See, e.g., Note, supra note 65, at 477. Cf. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4
N.Y.2d 553, 564, 152 N.E.2d 42, 48, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 606 (1958) (dissenting

opinion).

77 Michigan has attempted to avoid the problem altogether by allowing nonconforming uses to continue but authorizing condemnation of them, declaring such
condemnation to be for a public purpose. MIcHr. STAT. ANN. § 5.2933(1) (1958).
78 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert.

denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929), upholding a New Orleans ordinance passed pursuant
to LA. CONST. art. 14, § 29, which authorizes municipalities to pass zoning ordinances
and "to prohibit the establishment of places of business in residential districts."
79 E.g., Fratcher, Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repair of
Existing Structures, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 642, 644 (1937); Noel, Retroactive Zoning
and Nuisances, 41 CoLum. L. REv.457, 468-69 (1941) ; Comment, 39 YALE LJ. 735
(1930) ; cf. Fordham, Legal Aspects of Local Planning and Zoning it Louisiana,

6 LA. L. REv. 495, 507 (1946).
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to questions of proper land use. Superficially it could be said that land-use
considerations impelled the loss: the zoning ordinance was aimed at eliminating nonconforming uses. But the fact remains that the line drawn between those nonconforming uses which may continue and those which may
not is fashioned by considerations wholly personal to the landowners. All
that such an ad hominem provision accomplishes is to render the property
relatively unmarketable without insuring, concomitantly, that the nonconformity will be eliminated within a reasonable time.80
The argument that change of ownership should require the cessation
of a nonconformity has not been made in many cases.81 More often the
concern has been with applications for the expansion of such nonconforming
uses beyond their original limits.82 The reason offered for allowing the
expansion of a nonconformity is that to require its limitation would be too
great a hardship on the owner-precisely the consideration which must be
urged in variance applications for new uses. 83 The reasoning of the selfimposed hardship doctrine, if applied to applications by purchasers subsequent to the passage of the ordinance to expand nonconformities, would be
that the applicant need not have purchased the nonconformity and cannot
now complain of any hardship with regard to it.84 Nevertheless the courts
have not explained their failure to apply this rule where logic seems to
require it.
SINGLE AND SEPARATE OWNERSHIP PROVISIONS

Some property can never be made to conform. An illustration of such
a situation is provided when permission is sought to build on a lot which
80 Although the Idaho court in O'Connor properly rejected such an objectionable
result, the language of the court's opinion is unacceptable. The decision suggests that
existing nonconformities could never be legally terminated without direct compensation; for one of the likely consequences of the ordinance which disturbed the court
was that the rights of heirs would be jeopardized by an owner's death. O'Connor v.
City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 43, 202 P.2d 401, 405 (1949).
81 And the argument, when made, has been rejected. E.g., Schneider v. Board
of Appeals, 402 Ill. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949) ; Hawkins v. Talbot, 248 Minn. 549,
80 N.W.2d 863 (1957) ; Rogers v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 308
N.Y. 126, 123 N.E.2d 806 (1954). But see Todd v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 162,
148 N.E.2d 380 (1958).
82 Compare Endara v. City of Culver, 140 Cal. App. 2d 33, 294 P.2d 1003 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1956), and Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957), and Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24
Misc. 2d 790, 200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1960), and Hailer Baking Co.'s Appeal,
295 Pa. 257, 145 AtI. 77 (1928), with Paramount Rock Co. v. County of San Diego,
180 Cal. App. 2d 217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), and Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 39, 149 N.E.2d 65, 172 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1958), atd State
ex rel. Jack v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 281, 123 N.E.2d 261 (1954). See generally
Note, supra note 64, at 97-100; Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 1039 (1950); Annot., 147 A.L.R.
167 (1943).
83 See Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1396, 1402 (1961).
84 Compare Rogers v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 308 N.Y. 126,
123 N.E.2d 806 (1954), and Elsinore Property Owners' Ass'n v. Morwand Homes,
Inc., 286 App. Div. 1105, 146 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1955) (both cases allowing a nonconformity to be transferred), with Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 App. Div. 2d 850, 190
N.Y.S.2d 543, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 852, 164 N.E.2d 863, 196 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1959) (stating
the self-imposed hardship rule).
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has been substandard as to size since the date of the ordinance's passage.
Insofar as the applicant hopes to commence a new, although otherwise conforming, use of the property he may be said to be applying for a variance
and must make a showing of hardship. But insofar as the hardship is
caused by a feature of the property which has existed since the ordinance's
passage, the hardship is "built in," as in the nonconformity situation. For
that reason, many ordinances provide that lots substandard as to size may
be built upon if they have been held in "single and separate ownership"
since the ordinance's passage.8 5 This language, coupled with uncertainty
as to whether an application to build is an application for a variance or
for a permit to continue a nonconforming use, could raise perplexing
problems. For instance, if the application is treated as seeking a variance
and the owner holds other property adjacent to the lot for which the permit
is sought, should he have to prove not only that the parcel has been single
since the ordinance's passage but also that he cannot reasonably join the
adjacent lot? Does "single . . . ownership" mean that the applicant
must be the owner at the time of the ordinance's passage, or does it mean
that any subsequent owner may apply provided the lot has never been split
off from a larger piece of land that has always been used by the applicant
and his predecessors as a separate and independent holding? If the former
interpretation is chosen-if it is the owner's relationship to the land and not
the land itself which controls the disposition of these questions-the approach could operate ad hominem.8 6 It is suggested that a more precise
phrase should be used in the statutes, such as "property comprising a single
commercial parcel since the passage of the ordinance."
Under statutes employing "single and separate ownership" language
there is general agreement that the transfer of a single lot not adjacent to
other property of the transferee or transferor will not impose a disability
on the transferee.87 Where, however, there is such adjacent property,
courts are divided as to whether either the initial or subsequent owner must
join the properties so as to achieve conformity 88 Certainly if the owner
8

5E.g., Lower Merion, Pa., Ordinance 640, March 16, 1927, as amended, July 19,
1939, § 1609. See substantially similar provision in MODEL ZONING ORDINANcE § 4(2),
and Chicago, Ill., Zoning Ordinance, April 5, 1923, as amended, § 23, in 3 METZENBAUM, ZONING 2210 (2d ed. 1955).
86 Cf. note 15 supra.
s7 E.g., Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954); Peterson v. Vasak, 162
Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956) (semble); Sommese v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
22 Misc. 2d 628, 201 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Peters & Whalen, Inc. v.
Schnetzer, 194 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates,
Inc., 12 Misc. 2d 607, 172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 757, 181
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1958) ; Macchia v. Board of Appeals, 7 Misc. 2d 763, 765, 164 N.Y.S.2d
463, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (dictum) ; Appeal of Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n, 361 Pa.
322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949); Denton v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 86 R.I. 219, 133 A.2d
718 (1957). But cf. syllabus statement in Hood v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 6 Pa.
D. & C.2d275 (C.P. 1955).
88 Compare Russell v. Board of Adjustment, 31 N.J. 58, 155 A.2d 83 (1959)
(owner not required to join adjacent lots to achieve conformity), and Schack v.
Trimble, 28 N.J. 40, 145 A.2d 1 (1958) (owner not required to join adjacent substandard lots purchased on different dates after passage of ordinance and never
treated as single), with Howland v. Acting Superintendent of Bldgs., 328 Mass. 155,
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But if the owner does not
desires to join he should be allowed to do so.
so desire, the issue should be whether the properties can reasonably be
joined without becoming so large or oddly shaped as to be relatively unmarketable.90 The question should not turn on the fact that the original
owner, rather than the present applicant, owned a particular parcel at a
given time.

CONCLUSIONS

In one sense the human element cannot be kept out of zoning litigation:
the impetus behind almost every challenge to an ordinance or zoning board
1
ruling is that it threatens to depress the value of the challenger's property."
If the ordinance reads clearly and the power to enact it has not been unconstitutionally delegated,92 its validity and reach will turn on the result
of balancing the gain to the public and the disadvantage to the individual
landowner by its strict application in individual cases.93 The Supreme
Court has said that a diminution in the value of land by three-fourths of the
pre-ordinance value, when wrought by legislation otherwise reasonable, is
permissible under the police power and not confiscatory.94 Nevertheless,
it must be recognized that the choice of means for achieving zoning goals
is not unlimited. As Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon:9 5
102 N.E.2d 423 (1951) (owner not allowed to subdivide lot with three houses thereon
and sell as three lots), and Ardolino v. Board of Adjustment, 24 N.J. 94, 108, 130 A.2d

847, 855 (1957)

(dictum).

See also Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d

420 (1956) (developer subdivided lots and filed plot plan not conforming with terms
of ordinance later declared invalid; purchaser after invalidation granted variance).
89 One case, however, has held otherwise. State ex rel. Jack v. Russell, 162 Ohio
St. 281, 123 N.E.2d 261 (1954). The grounds for decision are confusing, but appear
to be a combination of self-imposed hardship reasoning and concern that the owner
would build so many houses on the interior lots in question (which he hoped to join
with his street lots to achieve the required street frontage) that a fire hazard would
be created.
(owner bought two
90 But see Volpe Appeal, 384 Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956)
irregularly shaped lots totalling 32,500 square feet in a 20,000 minimum district and
then sold 20,000 square feet; remainder held to be self-created hardship).
91 See, e.g., Howland v. Acting Superintendent of Bldgs., 328 Mass. 155, 161, 102
N.E.2d 423, 426 (1951) ("A large proportion of the owners of lands and buildings
affected by zoning ordinances could say with equal truth that their lands would be
more saleable if there were no such ordinances"); Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 207, 81 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1957) (suit for declaratory judgment brought "to improve the marketability of the property" in question). See also
Spalding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 719, 137 A.2d 755 (1957) (previous
owner could not sell for 35 years; rule of self-imposed hardship applied to purchaser) ;
Lumund v. Board of Adjustment, 4 N.J. 577, 73 A.2d 545 (1950) (rule of self-imposed
hardship applied even though applicant could not find buyer for 12 years) ; Edwards
Zoning Case, 392 Pa. 188, 140 A.2d 110 (1958) (fact that owner paid $28,000 for
property which ordinance now renders worth $12,000 does not justify finding of
; Note, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 516, 520 nn.33, 34 (1955).
hardship)
92 Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931), held part of an early
Illinois zoning enabling statute invalid on this ground.
93 E.g., White v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 176, 338 P.2d 778 (1959), which
held that where the disadvantage to the neighborhood would be slight, a reduction
to one-fourth of the preordinance value was grounds for a variance.
94
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). But cf. White v.
City of Twin Falls, mupra note 93.

95260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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We are in danger of forgetting that a strong desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.96
One of the most arbitrary short cuts which zoning boards and courts have
been disposed to use is the solution of zoning problems by the use of personal restrictions rather than analysis based on the condition of the land in
question, regardless of who its owner may be or have been.
Zoning laws being of recent origin,9 7 it is perhaps understandable that
some courts have fallen into the habit of examining the equities of the
owner as if he were a party litigant in an adversary proceeding. But the
facts that applications may be made ex parte 98 and that resistance to applications before the zoning board is conducted by informal protest in most
cases 99 lead to the conclusion that the applicant should appear not as the
owner standing up for his own personal interest in the premises but as the
voice by which the land speaks. The question before the zoning board
ought always to be: does the land in its physical surroundings justify the
board in relaxing the zoning standards without regard to the individual
who happens to be the owner? ' 0 0 Any attempt to frame the question in
terms of the identity and circumstances of the applicant makes zoning
speak ad hominem rather than to the land and leads to arbitrary results not
based on sound zoning principles.
L.E.W.
6Id.at 416.
In this country the first zoning law designated as such was that of New York
in 1916. BASSETr, ZONING 20-21 (1936).
08 See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7.
07

99 See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516, 528 (1955).

100 See, e.g., Olevson v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 71 R.I. 303, 307, 44 A.2d 720, 722
ZONING 12 (2d ed. 1955) : "indeed, the 'use' limitation may

(1945) ; 1 METZENBAUM,

be said to be the cardinal and primary motif of comprehensive zoning; not its [sic]
ownership. . . ." Thus statutes ordinarily provide that classification shall be according to "the location, size, use, and height of buildings," MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.05
(1947), for the purposes of lessening congestion, preventing fire and depression in
value, and promoting sanitation, health, adequate transport, vater, and sewage disposal, so as "to encourage the most appropriate use of land . . . and to preserve
and increase its amenities," MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 40A, § 3 (1961).

